Baby Steps Toward Better Pharmaceutical Care: Market Exclusivity Incentives to Research Pediatric Drug Uses Under the FDA Modernization and Accountability Act of 1997 by Brown, Nathan A.
 
Baby Steps Toward Better Pharmaceutical Care: Market
Exclusivity Incentives to Research Pediatric Drug Uses Under the
FDA Modernization and Accountability Act of 1997
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Baby Steps Toward Better Pharmaceutical Care: Market
Exclusivity Incentives to Research Pediatric Drug Uses Under
the FDA Modernization and Accountability Act of 1997 (1998
Third Year Paper)
Accessed February 19, 2015 9:32:43 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8852147
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAABABY STEPS TOWARD BETTER PHARMACEUTICAL CARE:
MARKET EXCLUSIVITY
INCENTIVES TO RESEARCH PEDIATRIC DRUG USES UNDER THE
FDA MODERNIZATION AND
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1997
by
Nathan A. Brown
Introduction
For much of the history of food and drug law in the United States, the pro-
tection of children has served as the impetus behind signicant and benecial
reforms. Prior to 1902, Congress had been unable to pass federal legislation
regulating food and drugs. However, after several children died from a tetanus-
infected diphtheria antitoxin, Congress promptly enacted The Biologics Act of
1902,' implementing licensing requirements for biological drugs sold in interstate
commerce.2 Later, during the New Deal, Congress attempted unsuccessfully to
strengthen the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).3 Then, after more than
one hundred children died from the ingestion of Elixir Sulfanilamide, Congress
passed the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.4 Finally, in
'32 Stat. 728 (1902).
2 PETER BARTON HUn & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG
LAW 8 (2d ed.
1991).
~ The FDA began in 1927 as the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration;
its name was changed to the Food and Drug Administration in 1931. See Beth
B. Myers, The Food and Drug Administration 's Experimental Drug Approval
System: Is it Good for Your Health?, 28 HOUS. L. REv. 309, 311 (1991).
52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. x 301 et seq. (1996).
The stronger legislation required drug manufacturers to prove a drug's safety
before marketing it. See Anne B. Wells, Regulating Experimental AIDS Drugs.'
A Comparison of the United States and France, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L& COMP.
L.J. 393, 397 (1990).
11962, Congress successfully passed the Kefauver-Harris Amendments5 to the
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act only after the use of thalidomide by pregnant
women caused deformed children.6
The Food and Drug Modernization Act of l997~ (the Act) has the opportu-
nity to provide a fourth episode in this series. As part of a long-debated reform
of the FDA aimed in part at facilitating drug approval, the Act attempts to
provide a market-based incentive for drug companies to test drugs for pediatric
use for drugs that have been or will be approved for adult use. Specically,
Section 111 of the Act creates a new Section SOSA of the Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act (505A) that provides for six months of additional market exclusivity,
beyond both the market exclusivity already provided by
8
statute and that provided by patent protection, when a drug company, upon
request by
the FDA, tests its product, whether already approved or not, for use by
children.9 SOSA attempts to remedy the general lack of information about pe-
diatric drug
use.'0 According to the American Academy of Pediatrics, roughly eighty
percent of drug
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, (codied at 21 U.S.C. xx
321-81 (1996).
6 the FDA never approved thalidomide in the United States, it had
been distributed to women in the U.S. as an investigational new drug (IND).
The 1962 Amendments broadened the denition of new drug and repealed the
sixty-day automatic approval for new drugs. See Myers, supra note 3, at 312
n.17.
'~ 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
~ Part II, infra, which discusses the 1984 Drug Price Competition Act, 98
Stat. 1585.
9ii 1 Stat. 2296.
10 See, e.g., David A. Kessler, M.D., Remarks by the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs,
50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 327, 330 (1995) (noting that information about a
drug's safety and eectiveness in adults is insucient for use in children, who
are not miniature adults).
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2prescriptions for children are o-label. This situation results from a combina-
tion of factors: rst, physicians are free to prescribe drugs according to their
approved uses or for o-label uses;'2 second, pharmaceutical companies may
generally only promote drugs for their FDA-approved uses, even if evidence of
other uses is available;'3 third, companies often have little incentive to test and
seek approval of already-approved drugs for additional uses;'4 and, fourth, com-
panies have even less incentive to test for pediatric use, as children provide a
smaller product market.'5
See Congressional Testimony of Sarah F. Jagger, Director of Health Ser-
vices Quality and Public Health Issues (Sept. 12, 1996), available in 1996 WL
10830746 [hereinafter Jagger Testimony]. O-label refers to the prescription of
a drug for any unapproved use, either in the way the drug is prescribed or to
whom it is prescribed.
12
See 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503 (1972).
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. xx 310.3(h)(4), 3 12.7(a), 314.70(b)(3) (1996). The Act
loosens restrictions on promotion of information about unapproved uses. See
infra note 30, and accompanying text.
See Richard M. Cooper, Unapproved Uses of Drugs.' An Analysis and Some
Proposals, 49 Food & Drug L.J. 533, 535 (1994) (noting that although manu-
facturers are in the best position to provide information to physicians regard-
ing drug treatment, a manufacturer has little or no incentive to generate in-
formation on the safety and eectiveness of the unapproved use). See also
ROBERT HIGGS, HAZARDOUS TO OUR HEALTH? FDA REGULATION
OF HEALTH CARE PRODUCTS 17 (1995) (reasoning that even if a new use
for a drug is discovered, if the patent is about to expire the rm may have
little incentive to nance these additional tests); Congressional Testimony of
Dr. Sanford N. Cohen, American Academy of Pediatrics, House Subcommit-
tee on Health and Environment (Apr. 23, 1997), available in 1997 WL 208511
[hereinafter Cohen Testimony] (Once a drug is marketed for an adult indication,
the economic incentive to do additional studies to include pediatric labeling is
markedly reduced because the drug may be prescribed o label.).
'5See Cohen Testimony, supra note 14 (explaining that, with a few excep-
tions such as antibiotics, pediatric use of a drug makes up a small proportion
of the total market).
3
3However, questions remain regarding both the interpretation and future eec-
tiveness of 505A. This paper attempts to analyze these issues, attempting to
anticipate ways of improving the statute and making recommendations for the
provision's eectiveness. Part I of this paper reviews the perceived need for
greater pediatric drug information and previous attempts at improving pedi-
atric pharmaceutical treatment. Part II summarizes SOSA itself in relation
to current patent and exclusivity provisions. Part III examines 505A in light
of the current regulatory system and nancial incentives, arguing that greater
FDA discretion in implementing the provision and/or greater reliance on mar-
ket forces would make SOSA more eective. Finally, Part IV argues that SOSA
should be expanded beyond pediatric studies, to provide incentive for further
drug studies for adult indications as well.
I. History of SOSA:
a. Children as Therapeutic Orphans
The lack of prescription drugs approved and labeled for pediatric use, and the
lack of information about the eectiveness on children of drugs developed for
adults, has lead some to call America's children therapeutic orphans.'6 Roughly
eighty percent of prescription drugs marketed in the United States contain a
disclaimer that the drug has not been tested for pediatric use.'7 In many cases,
however, the dearth of available drug products approved for pediatric uses forces
physicians to prescribe drugs o-label, despite any disclaimers. The lack of
approved drugs in pediatric cancer treatment is
16 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105-43, at 51(1997).
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4especially revealing. While physicians have been successful in improving the
rates of cure, virtually every therapy available.., involves the o-label use of
approved anticancer drugs.'8 Cancer treatment is by no means the only area
for concern. For instance, there is no migraine drug that has been approved for
pediatric use by the FDA;
consequently, doctors often recommend Excedrin for children, even though
it contains
j9
aspirin.
While physicians do treat children by prescribing drugs o-label, this mea-
sure is not a panacea, and can be dangerous. Animal models and trials in adults
cannot accurately predict the eect of a drug on children, a group that encom-
passes a wide range of developmental stages.20 To determine accurately the
safety and eectiveness of a drug, the great diversity within the pediatric pop-
ulation might even necessitate the study of a drug in various pediatric groups,
ranging from neonates to adolescents.21
'7See Cohen Testimony, supra note 14.
Changes in the FDA.' Hearings on More information for Better Patient
Care Before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Comm., 104th Cong.
(1996) (statement of Gregory H. Reaman, M.D., Chairman, Dep't of Hema-
tology/Oncology, Children's National Medical Center) available in 1996 WL
75269 [hereinafter Reaman Testimony] (If physcians were restricted to using
anticancer agents only for the purposes approved by the FDA, the success of
pediatric cancer treatment would not be what it is today.).
'~ While Excedrin is now available over the counter, it is still intended only
for people over twelve years old, due to its aspirin content. See Migraines: FDA
OKs Excedrin as 1st Over-the-Counter Treatment, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 1998,
(News), at 7.
205ee Cohen Testimony, supra note 14.
2! See id (recommending the study of neonates, infants, young children, and
adolescents as distinct subpopulations to determine a drug's ecacy, toxicity,
dosing, and appropriate formulations for each group).
5
5Furthermore, drugs unapproved for pediatric use typically lack dosage recom-
mendations for children, and often are manufactured in dosage forms not acces-
sible to children.22
Even when o-label uses of drugs are seemingly safe and eective, physicians
often fail to receive information about these treatment options. Typically, while
physicians in academic research hospitals may be privy to innovative treatment
possibilities, community physicians are unlikely to be suciently informed
and to remain
23
up to date about treatment options. Moreover, the lack of accurate, con-
trolled studies and FDA's approval may lead even those informed physicians to
hesitate in prescribing
treatments o-label. Their hesitancy stems naturally from their duty to
provide safe and eective patient care and from the threat of liability for medical
malpractice.24
Thus, lack of FDA approval for pediatric use forces physicians to choose
between prescribing with imperfect labeling and inadequate understanding of
the drug's ecacy, or denying children access to potentially life-saving or ther-
apeutic drugs. Yet, the potential solution{ increasing studies for pediatric
indications{ has more obstacles than just the lack of nancial incentive among
manufacturers. For instance, the study of new drugs on children, for whom the
risks may be greater due to organ development, poses
22 For instance, many drugs are manufactured in capsules or tablets that
cannot be swallowed by children or are unavailable in small enough dosage
increments to give the proper amount to a child. See id
23 See Reaman Testimony, supra note 18 (explaining that community physi-
cians have busy practices and are simply unable to remain aware of current
o-label treatment options; consequently, while a young child with cancer will
often be treated in a major institution, a teenager with cancer is likely to be
treated in a community setting where information is lacking).
2See S. REP. No. 105-43, at 57(1997).
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6ethical issues.25 Moreover, pediatric patients are more dicult to attract into
studies.26 For these reasons and others, the FDA has been reluctant to require
pediatric studies for a new drug unless the primary use of the drug will be for
children.27
Various solutions have been oered to improve pediatric drug treatment,
including requiring pediatric studies. Unfortunately, these proposals have sig-
nicant drawbacks. Some of the more common proposals will be analyzed in
turn:
1) Loosening restrictions on pharmaceutical companies concerning dissemination of
data: Prior to the FDA Modernization and Accountability Act, the FDA re-
stricted pharmaceutical companies to promoting their drug products only for
approved uses.28 However, the new legislation amends the Food Drug & Cos-
metic Act by specically allowing manufacturers to disseminate information on
unapproved uses of approved
29
drugs, subject to certain restrictions. Allowing manufacturers to publicize
25 See id
265ee id
275ee Cohen Testimony, supra note 14.
28 21 C.F.R. 202.1 (e)(4) (1997). However, manufacturers could supply
physicians
with independent studies if they were requested. See Jagger Testimony, supra
note 11.
29 111 Stat. 2296, x 401 (1997). Information can be distributed only if: the
product is approved; in the case of information produced by a manufacturer, the
manufacturer has given permission; the information is submitted to the FDA
sixty days before distribution; a supplemental application covering the new use
is led with the FDA; and, the information contains a prominent statement
that the use has not been approved. See id. (new section 551(b) of the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act). The information can be distributed to practitioners,
health care professionals, and governmental agencies, but not to patients. See
id (new section 55 1(a) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act). Finally, the
only information that a manufacturer may distribute is an unabridged reprint
of a peerreviewed, scientically sound article published in a scientic or medical
journal, or a reference publication, produced independently of the manufacturer,
containing similar information. Id (new section 552 of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act).
7
7independently-produced information about their products may aid physicians
in treating
children. Arguably, physicians are adequately trained to assess the literature
in light of
30
their training. Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies are in the best po-
sition, and have the nancial incentive, to provide treatment information to
physicians quickly.3'
Proponents of liberalizing the dissemination rules regarding unapproved uses
note that the current system ignores the reality that a great deal of treatments,
including virtually all treatments for diseases such as cancer, are prescribed
o-label.32
Loosening the restrictions on drug promotion also has signicant drawbacks.
First, allowing companies to provide information directly to physicians or health
professionals for o-label pediatric use is likely to reduce substantially the in-
centive for companies to conduct the scientic trials necessary for additional
approvals.33 This, in turn, may actually reduce the amount of reliable informa-
tion about the safety and eectiveness of drugs. Second, studies by peer-review
journals may be limited in scope and insucient according to FDA standards
of approval.34 In addition, journals only
305ee Reaman Testimony, supra note 18 (arguing that peer-reviewed jour-
nal studies generally include adequate detail to allow physicians to understand
dosing requirements, methods of administration, toxicity, and other variables
necessary to treat patients to a greater extent than does the information pro-
vided in FDA-approved labeling).
31Seeid
32 Changes in the FDA. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Bruce A. Chabner, M.D.,
Clinical Director of the Cancer Center of the Massachusetts General Hospital)
available in 1996 WL 77253 [hereinafter Chabner Testimony].
335ee Cohen Testimony, supra note 14.
For instance, peer-review studies may use an insucient number of subjects,
collect incomplete data, or fail to account for interaction of the tested drug with
other
8
8publish a limited number of articles; even if the studies are comprehensive,
the peer-review forum is too limited to report all the information potentially
available and useful in pediatric treatment. Third, non-pediatric practitioners
often prescribe drugs to children.35 Insucient or incomplete information places
children at an even greater risk in the hands of physicians inexperienced with
pediatric care. Thus, in light of the signicant questions surrounding these less
restrictive dissemination provisions, the provisions clearly are not an adequate
substitute for increasing the amount of FDA-approved pediatric uses available
to physicians.
2) ReQuiring pediatric studies of drugs likely to be used in treating children:
Under this approach, an independent panel of advisors may advise the FDA
in determining which new drugs might have pediatric applications, what types
of studies should be required, and which previously approved drugs should also
be tested for pediatric use.36 Proponents of requiring pediatric studies usually
favor the maintenance of tight restrictions on the promotion of o-label use.37
Those in favor of mandatory testing note that the FDA's attempts at obtaining
pediatric prescribing information from
compounds. See id The new dissemination provisions in the Act also increase
the FDA's policing responsibilities, as the agency will have to make an individual
determination about the scientic soundness of each article to be distributed.
355ee Cohen Testimony, supra note 14.
365ee id
375ee id
9
9drug manufacturers on a voluntary basis have failed; most new drugs are still
being approved without pediatric information.38
However, mandatory testing also has signicant disadvantages. Mandatory
testing is likely to result in disincentives for drug development. Due to the
signicant cost of trial studies,39 anticipation of mandatory pediatric studies
in addition to adult studies could impede research on drug therapies for both
children and adults.40 Testing experimental drugs on children also poses ethical
dilemmas related to the eect of these trials on a child's organ development and
to issues of informed consent.41 Furthermore, opponents question whether the
FDA has legal authority to force a drug sponsor to test
385ee Joseph K. Zanga, M.D., Testing Drugs for Kids.' Pro, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 21, 1997, at 1 J (stating, in reference to the s proposed
rule, that of the seven new drugs proposed in 1991 for which pediatric studies
were promised, only one ultimately had pediatric labeling).
~ estimates place the research and development costs of developing
a new drug between $359 million (see PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH &
MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, INDUSTRY PROFILE 1996 at 13) and
$500 million (see STANDARD & PooR's, INDUSTRY SURVEYS- HEALTH-
CARE: PHARMACEUTICALS 19 (1997)). One of the main sources of devel-
opment costs is clinical trials. See Boston Consulting Group, The Contribution
of Pharmaceutical Companies.' What's at Stake for America, Sept. 1993.
~ Prescription Drugs and FDA Overhaul.' Hearing before the Health
and
Environment Subcomm. of the House Commerce Comm., 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement
of Susan L. Weiner, North American Brain Tumor Coalition) available in
1997 WL
228096 [hereinafter Weiner Testimony].
41 See Chabner Testimony, supra note 32. The pharmaceutical industry has
raised the ethical dilemma of testing children in its protest against the proposed
FDA regulations requiring drug companies to test products for pediatric use. See
Robert Pear, Testing Drugs in Children Opposed.' Clinton Proposal is Raising
All Sorts of Ethical Questions, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 30, 1997, at Al. The
same ethical dilemma should apply to voluntary testing under the new Section
505A as well. However, given that drugs without pediatric testing are already
being used in children, and will continue to be used in children, there seems to be
little added risk in testing these drugs on a limited sample of children. Actually,
testing a limited sample before doctors across the country start experimenting
on their own likely is a safer alternative.
10
10and label a drug for an age group for which it does not intend to market the
product.42 Whether of not the FDA has authority, Congress' recent push to ease
the regulatory burden on pharmaceutical companies indicates that it is unlikely
to support mandatory testing either.
3) More funding to independent organizations like NIH to research pediatric therapies:
Despite disagreement over the previous two proposals, virtually all quarters in
the debate support funding more research into treating children.43 While in-
creasing pediatric research is a commendable goal, any increase in funding suc-
cessfully passed into law would not be sucient to address the signicant lack of
information regarding pediatric drug treatment. Thus, while additional fund-
ing could increase information about pediatric drug treatment, by itself it is
insucient to address the problem.
4) Providing economic incentives to drug manufacturers to conducts studies of their products for pediatric use:
Congress ultimately adopted an economic incentive approach in 505A. First pro-
posed in 1994 as the Better Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, the proposal was
supported by many in the children's health care community.45
425ee Rx Makers Challenge FDA on Pediatric Studies, DRUG TOPICS,
Dec. 8, 1997, at 26, available in 1997 WL 13740742.
~ See, e.g, Weiner Testimony, supra note 40 (arguing for federal nancial
support for pediatric research). See also National Institutes of Health Reau-
thorization: Hearing Before the Senate Labor Public Health and Safety Comm.,
105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine) (arguing for greater investment
in innovations in children's health care).
See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
455ee, e.g., Cohen Testimony, supra note 14; Chabner Testimony, supra note
32.
11
11However, detractors doubt that six months of market exclusivity will provide
enough incentive to drug manufacturers.46
b. Unsuccessful Regulatory Eorts to Require Labeling and Encour-
age Testing The current legislation is only the latest in recent governmental
attempts to
improve pharmaceutical care for children. Previously, FDA regulations have
aimed at either expanding labeling or requiring some degree of clinical testing.
In 1979, the FDA published regulations specifying the content and format of
prescription drug labeling, including a stipulation that pediatric labeling be
based on adequate, controlled studies involving children.47 The FDA intended
that these regulations would lead to the provision of adequate information about
the use of drugs in children.48 Instead, drug makers began adding to labels a
disclaimer that the safety and eectiveness of the drug in children had not been
established.49
465ee e.g., Weiner Testimony, supra note 40. Skeptics of the nancial incen-
tive approach seemingly prefer a stick approach (requiring testing) to a carrot
approach (encouraging testing), as the carrot approach has not been successful
so far. For further analysis of the potential drawbacks of this approach, see
infra Part 111(a).
See 44 Fed. Reg. 37,462 (1979); 21 C.F.R. x 201.57 (1996). In 1974,
the FDA had revised the general labeling requirements by prohibiting label
statements describing dierences of opinion among experts regarding product
warnings. See 39 Fed.Reg. 33,229 (1974). Note, however, that the FDA does
permit labels to state dierences of opinion with respect to eectiveness if the
opinions are supported by substantial evidence as dened by sections 505(d)
and 5 12(d) of the Act. In 1975, the FDA had amended the over the counter
(OTC) regulations by requiring a label on all OTC drugs that wamed against
accessibility to children. See 40 Fed.Reg. 11,717 (1975); 21 C.F.R. x 330.1(g)).
48 See Cohen Testimony supra note 14.
'~ See id
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12The FDA attempted to take corrective action in 1994. In an eort to increase
pediatric information in drug labeling, the FDA published regulations that ac-
cepted several methods of establishing substantial evidence supporting pediatric
labeling claims.50 However, according to one observer, two years after the regu-
lations had gone into eect, it was not yet apparent that they [had] resulted in
any increase in new drug labeling for children.5'
Most recently, President Clinton announced proposed FDA regulations that
would require drug makers to test their products in children if the drugs were
used or were likely to be used in a substantial number of children, or if they
potentially provided a signicant therapeutic benet over existing pediatric
treatments.52 Despite the FDA's eorts, few substantial advances in improving
pediatric drug treatment have been made. According to a survey by the Amer-
ican Academy of Pediatrics, in 1995 only three of the twenty-ve new drugs
approved had pediatric labeling.53 Between 1984 and 1995, approximately 80%
of approved new molecular entities contained no labeling for pediatric use, even
though many of them have been used widely in treating children.54 By utilizing
market incentives, 505A represents a dierent approach to a lingering problem.
505ee 59 Fed. Reg. 64,240; 65,738 (1994). Acceptable labeling claims can
include published pediatric information or approval of pediatric use based on
adult ecacy studies where the disease for which the drug is to be used is
substantially the same in children and adults. See id
~' Cohen Testimony, supra note 14.
525ee Pear, supra note 41. See also 62 Fed. Reg. 43,900; 51,071 (1997).
~ Cohen Testimony, supra note 14.
~ id.
13
13II. Section 505A: Oering a Carrot to Industry
Section 505A of the FDA Modernization and Accountability Act of l997~~ was
rst introduced in similar form in 1992 as the Better Pharmaceuticals for Chil-
dren Act. 56 Congress approved overwhelmingly the Act as a whole,57 with
market incentives for pediatric studies under Section 505A considered to be one
of the Act's central achievements.58
A review of the system of exclusivity existing prior to the 1997 Act is useful
in analyzing the incentive system implemented by 505A. 505A amends the ex-
clusivity provisions of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act that were established
in 1984 under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
(Waxman-Hatch Act).59 The Waxman-Hatch Act protects drug manufacturers
by providing periods of market exclusivity and patent protection. Once a new
drug application (NDA) for a new
~ Ill Stat. 2296 (1997). Section 3 of the Act amends Chapter V (21 U.S.C
351 et. seq.) of the Food Drug & Cosmetic Act by creating a new section, 505A,
Pediatric Studies of Drugs [hereinafter 505A].
561t was originally introduced by Senator Nancy Kassebaum as S3337. See
138 CONG. REC. S 16979-02 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Kassebaum).
57The Act passed the Senate by a 98 - 2 margin. See 143 CoNG. REC. 5
12241-02 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997) (statement of Sen. Dodd). The Act passed
the House by voice-vote. See CONGRESS DAILY (Oct. 7. 1997) available in
1997 WL 11443852.
585ee, e.g., 143 CoNG. REC. H10531-0l (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997) (statement
of Rep.
Dingell) (touting the provision of market incentives for pediatric studies). See
also id
(statement of Rep. Waxman) (same); 143 CoNG. REC. 5 12241-02 (daily ed.
Nov. 9,
1997) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (same).
59Pub.L. 98-417, 1984; 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
14
14chemical entity (NCE) is approved, an abbreviated NDA60 will not be accepted
by the FDA for ve years from the date of approval.6' After the FDA has
approved an NDA or supplemental NDA for a new indication or other variation
of an already-approved drug, an abbreviated NDA for the same variation will
not be approved for three years.62 Regarding patents, if the applicant of an
abbreviated NDA is not challenging the patent on a drug, the FDA cannot
approve an abbreviated NDA until the patent has expired.63 Finally, if the
applicant is challenging a patent, the FDA cannot approve the abbreviated NDA
for two and a half years.64 The three- and ve-year exclusivity provisions and
the patent provisions are independent of one another; in any given situation,
the longer of the two will be operative in determining the permissibility of
subsequent abbreviated NDA approvals.65
60An abbreviated NDA is an NDA that lacks the safety and eectiveness
data for approval of a full NDA, because the drug seeking approval is the same
in its indications and eects as a previously approved drug or is so similar that
use of the data on the previously approved drug is appropriate to approve the
generic copy. See FD&CA x
505(j)(2)(A), 21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(2)(A).
61 See FD&CA x 505(j)(4)(D)(ii). However, if the applicant is seeking to
challenge a patent on the drug, it can submit an abbreviated NDA after four
years. If a patent infringement suit is brought, on the other hand, the FDA
cannot approve the abbreviated NDA for seven and a half years after NDA
approval.
62 FD&CA xx 505(j)(4)(D)(iii), (iv).
63 See FD&CA x 505(j)(4)(B)(ii). If the patent has expired, the appli-
cant's abbreviated NDA can be approved with no waiting period. FD&CA xx
505(j)(2)(A)(vii), (j)(4)(B)(i).
~ See FD&CA x 505(j)(4)(B)(iii). If the patent holder wins, the FDA
cannot approve the abbreviated NDA until after the patent expires. See id
65 Paper NDAs are subject to the same patent and exclusivity provisions that
restrict approval of abbreviated NDAs. See FD&CA x 505A. Although a paper
NDA does require safety and eectiveness studies, similar to an abbreviated
NDA it may rely on published reports of studies without actual submission of
data. See FD&CA x 505(b)(2).
15
15In short, 505A provides an incentive for pediatric studies by extending exclusiv-
ity to both the original market exclusivity provisions and the patent protection
provisions under the Waxman-Hatch Act. Furthermore, the extended exclu-
sivity applies to adult and pediatric indications and variations alike.66 Each
subsection of Section 505A is summarized below:
Subsection (a): Provides that, prior to approval of a new drug, if the FDA
determines that information about the drug will produce pediatric health ben-
ets, and makes a written request for pediatric studies, and the studies are
completed and accepted by the FDA, then
67
the sponsor can receive six months of extra market exclusivity.
Subsection (b): Directs the FDA to produce a list of already-approved drugs
for which additional pediatric information may be useful in producing health
benets. The list is to be updated annually.68
Subsection (c): Authorizes the FDA to apply exclusivity to already-approved
drugs that are on the list created under subsection (b). After the list has been
published, the process mirrors that for new drugs: the FDA requests pediatric
studies, and if the FDA is
66Extending exclusivity only for pediatric uses would not be a sucient
inducement to carry out pediatric studies due to the small pediatric market; if
it were, this provision likely would not be necessary.
67FD&CA x 505A(a).
For an NCE, the period during which an abbreviated NDA cannot be sub-
mitted is extended from ve to ve and a half years. If the applicant is chal-
lenging a patent, the period of patent protection is extended from four to four
and a half years, and if litigation is brought the period is extended from seven
and a half to eight years. See FD&CA x505A(a)( 1 )(A)(i).
~For a drug that does not qualify as an NCE, the exclusivity period is extended
from three to three and a half years. See FD&CA x 505A(a)(1)(A)(ii).
Any applicable orphan drug exclusivity period is extended from seven to seven
and a half years. See FD&CA x 505A(a)(l)(B).
~For drugs subject to a patent not being challenged, the exclusivity period is
extended six months beyond the patent expiration. See FD&CA x505A(a)(2)(A).
~For drugs subject to a patent that is being challenged, the exclusivity
period is extended six months beyond the patent expiration. See FD&CA
x505A(a)(2)(B).
68 FD&CA x 505A(b) (1997)
16
16satised that the manufacturer has completed the studies, it may award six
months of additional exclusivity.69
Subsection (d): Species the procedures for conducting requested pediatric
studies. If the FDA and sponsor agree on written protocols, those protocols
satisfy the requirements. However, if they cannot agree on written protocols,
the FDA must determine whether the studies conducted fairly respond to the
request, have been carried out in accordance with commonly accepted scientic
principles, and have been properly reported.70
Subsection (e): Addresses situations in which a study report has been sub-
mitted before the expiration of a patent (or other form of exclusivity), but has
not been accepted or rejected by the Secretary at the time of expiration. In
such circumstances, the FDA is to delay acceptance of an abbreviated NDA
for another drug while it determines whether the study is accepted. This delay
may not exceed 90 days. If the pediatric study is subsequently accepted and
exclusivity is granted, the period of additional exclusivity will be considered to
have begun on the date of the expiration of the previous exclusivity.7'
Subsection (f): Requires the FDA to publish a notice of the acceptance of
pediatric studies under subsection (d) and granting of additional exclusivity.72
Subsection (g): Denes the term pediatric studies to mean at least one clin-
ical investigation in appropriate age groups, according to how the drug is ex-
pected to be used.73
Subsection (h): Limits the availability of exclusivity to one award per prod-
uct, except in the case of a drug supplemental application for a new use. In
that case, the FDA may award another six months of exclusivity to be added to
any exclusivity for the use of the drug that is available under Waxman-Hatch
authorities, but not for additional exclusivity beyond patent expiration.74
69FD&CA x 505A(c) (1997). As noted above, the additional exclusivity
applies whether derived from patent or Waxman-Hatch exclusivity. See (HR
105-3 10, p. 53) 70FD&CA x 505A(d) (1997). According to the Conference
Committee Managers Statement (p. 3), qualifying studies can be conducted
either before or after a request from the FDA has been made.
~' FD&CA x 505A(e) (1997).
72 FD&CA x 505A(f) (1997). This will notify potential applicants of ab-
breviated NDAs
that an additional six months of exclusivity will apply.
~ FD&CA x 505A(g) (1997). One purpose of this provision is to ensure
that the studies requested will not merely review existing data. See H.R. REp.
105-310, at 54 (1997).
74FD&CA x 505A(h) (1997).
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17Subsection (F): Provides that if, under any proposed regulations, the Secre-
tary requires pediatric studies, those studies are to be deemed to satisfy the
requirements under 505A and to be the basis for the award of exclusivity.75
Subsection (F): Terminates the FDA's authority to grant additional exclu-
sivity under this section on January 1, 2002. After that, exclusivity is available
only if(l) the drug was in commercial circulation when the FDA Modernization
Act went into eect; (2) the drug was on the FDA's subsection (b) list by Jan-
uary 1, 2002; (3) the FDA determines there is a continuing need for pediatric
information and that the drug may provide health benets to children; and, (4)
all of the requirements of 505A have been met.76
Subsection (k): Requires the FDA to conduct a study on the program and
submit a report to Congress by January 1, 2001. The study must include all
aspects of the program, as well as the impact of the program on the price and
availability of drugs, including generic drugs. ~
III. Strategies for Optimizing the Eectiveness of 505A:
The success of 505A remains to a large degree contingent upon as yet unresolved
issues. This is due in part to the interpretative ambiguities in the statute and
Congress' requirement of a report within a few years. Thus, 505A is experi-
mental and should be treated as a work in progress. Problems may arise with
the statute, most notably whether six months of extra market exclusivity is the
proper inducement to testing. Consequently, in applying the statute, and with
an eye toward its possible modication in a number of
FD&CA x 505A(i) (1997). Subsection (i) directly addresses the FDA's pro-
posed regulations, announced by President Clinton, under which the agency
could require pediatric studies to be performed. See 62 Fed. Reg. 43,900 (1997).
In eect, subsection (i) provides six months of market exclusivity even if the
sponsor isforcedto carry out pediatric studies, rather than doing so voluntarily
under 505A.
76FD&CA x 505A(j) (1997).
~ FD&CA x 505A(k) (1997).
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18years, two primary principles relied on within 505A should be further embraced:
agency discretion and utilization of market forces.
a. Expanding Agency Discretion
(i): Interpreting the Statute Currently to Give the FDA More Discretion:
Unlike much of the Act, which forces the FDA to act in a certain manner,78
505A actually gives the FDA greater discretion by expanding its authority over
exclusivity. Previously, the terms of exclusivity were codied; now, the FDA
has the authority, albeit limited, to add to those terms based on its discretion.79
In implementing 505A, the FDA will have to interpret parts of the provision
that Congress left unclear. For instance, 505A(a) authorizes the Secretary to
request pediatric studies;80 the FDA will have to determine which ocials have
the authority to request pediatric studies. Moreover, 505A(g) denes pediatric
studies as clinical investigations in pediatric age groups in which the drug is
anticipated to be used;8' yet, the age groups themselves are undened.
Regarding the request for pediatric studies, allowing review ocers to make
individual assessments of the usefulness of pediatric studies would maximize the
eectiveness of the statute. The drugs in question have not yet been approved,
and the
785ee, e.g, 111 Stat. 2296, x 401 (authorizing dissemination of information
about unapproved uses of approved drugs); x 502(a) (requiring that health care
economic information be based on competent and reliable scientic evidence, a
more lenient standard than that previously imposed by the FDA).
795ee x 505A.
80 x 505A(a)
81x505A(g)
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19average time for a drug to gain approval is over nineteen months.82 By decentral-
izing the decision to request studies under 505A, requests will be made faster,
manufacturers can begin more promptly, and the product and/or additional
pediatric information will be available sooner.
In specifying what age groups need to be tested as part of a manufacturer's
pediatric studies under 505A(g), the FDA should dene precisely the group
or groups
83
being targeted. The American Academy of Pediatrics has emphasized the
importance of dierentiating children in dierent developmental stages when
considering
pharmaceutical indications.84 It has recommended ve categories of children:
neonate, infant, toddler, young child, child, and adolescent, dened by age.85
Attempting to assess pediatric indications from overly general studies could
produce misleading information that may be harmful to children. Moreover,
overly general studies could obfuscate data wherein a drug is actually eective
for a subpopulation of ages within the pediatric range, but not for other children;
a generalized experimental design would average out the eects and make the
drug appear to be ineective. Thus, the FDA should determine if more than
one category of child could benet from pediatric studies, and request clinical
studies accordingly.
82 PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF AMER-
ICA, supra note 39, at
15 (citing the United States Food & Drug Administration).
Currently, the FDA only denes pediatric patients as ranging from birth to
sixteen years of age. See 21 C.F.R. x 201.57(f)(9) (1996). The FDA denes
infant as a child not more than twelve months old for dietary foods, see 21
C.F.R. x 105.3(e) (1996), but has not dened infant for drugs. See 21 C.F.R.
x 201.19 (1996).
845ee Cohen Testimony, supra note 14.
85 See id
20
20(ii): Revising the Statute to Give the FDA More Discretion:
The provision of six months of extra market exclusivity clearly is not subject
to FDA interpretation under 505A; it can grant it or not. However, the FDA
is required to report back to Congress by January 1, 2001 on the eectiveness
of the program, the adequacy of the incentives, and the economic impact of
the program.86 While the eect of the provision is unpredictable, the market
exclusivity program would benet from giving the FDA discretion to alter and
ne-tune the amount of exclusivity awarded.
Giving the FDA discretion to determine, within reason, the amount of ex-
clusivity would produce a more ecient system for gaining information about
pediatric drug indications. Congress could grant discretion in a number of ways.
For instance, the FDA could be required to utilize rulemaking proceedings to
determine categories of exclusivity based on the potential value of the cate-
gory of drugs in question. For a potential pediatric AIDS treatment, providing
more than six months of exclusivity might be a socially valuable investment.
For other drugs, less than six months might be a sucient inducement to con-
duct further studies; in this case granting six months is socially wasteful and
needlessly prevents the introduction of new drug products onto the market.
Another alternative would be for the FDA to determine appropriate amounts
of additional exclusivity on a case by case basis in adjudicatory proceedings.
While this would be more time consuming for the agency and carry the potential
for arbitrary or inconsistent decisionmaking, it would allow for more input from
manufacturers. Because
865ee x 505A(k)
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21manufacturers are in the best position to gauge the value of their products, their
input would allow the FDA to optimize social utility by measuring the value of
information about individual drugs.
Either alternative goes a long way towards eliminating the disadvantage of
505A as currently written. That is, Congress has determined, rather arbitrarily,
that the information to be gained from additional studies of pediatric drug use
is, on average, worth six months of exclusivity. By quantifying the value of this
information, manufacturers will be able to determine whether the studies will be
economically advantageous. Essentially, Congress is gambling that the average
utility of information gained about pediatric use of drugs will equal or exceed
the average value of six months of additional market exclusivity. However, many
of the individual drugs will produce
information below the value of six months of exclusivity.87 More importantly,
the
88
tradeo is a six month delay in new products, including much cheaper generic
versions,
entering the market. Granting the FDA discretion over the grant of exclu-
sivity avoids this outcome.
~ Signicantly, drugs receive the additional market exclusivity regardless of
whether the
clinical studies indicate that the drug actually is safe and eective for chil-
dren. See x
505A.
88 Generic drugs have been known to enter the market at a 90% discount
compared with the name brand. See STANDARD & PooR's, supra note 39, at
11.
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22b. Relying More Heavily on the Market
While giving the FDA more discretion, 505A also departs from other recent
drug law reforms by concentrating on market forces.89 Notably, utilization of
nancial incentives, voluntarily complied with, also reduces the need for signi-
cant enforcement responsibility and resource allocation by the FDA. Conversely,
while previous FDA reforms have been successful, they have also increased the
FDA's enforcement responsibilities.90 In 2001, when Congress reexamines the
program, it should consider relying even more heavily on market forces. For in-
stance, it should consider implementing a pilot program that releases the FDA
from any responsibility for annually making a list of previously approved drugs
for which additional pediatric information
would be useful,9' or from determining on a case by case basis whether such
information
92
would be useful regarding a drug awaiting approval. Instead, the pilot pro-
gram should
leave the decision to invest in pediatric studies entirely up to individual man-
ufacturers. Because manufacturers are very familiar with their pharmaceutical
products, they
will be in a position to determine the value of additional pediatric studies
more easily than the overburdened FDA. However, because manufacturers would
be free to conduct studies without waiting for a request, the FDA should only
award additional market
895ee HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGU-
LATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND
RISKS 7-8 (1983) (noting that the history of U.S. pharmaceutical regulation is
one of steady evolution away from attempting to make the market work better
in favor of implementing strong, centralized regulatory control).
905ee infra nn. 3-5 and accompanying text.
~' As the FDA is now required to do under x 505A(b).
92 the FDA is now required to do under x 505A(a).
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23exclusivity for sucient clinical studies that yielded valuable pediatric indi-
cations. This would serve to discourage manufacturers from over-investing in
pediatric studies. For those manufacturers whose drugs are already being pre-
scribed o-label, they would take the risk that their products are actually safe
and eective, and would be rewarded for clinically demonstrating so. Moreover,
reluctance on the part of a manufacturer to conduct the studies might indicate
to practitioners that the drug in question is not necessarily safe and eective.
The FDA would still have to evaluate the results of studies, despite leaving
manufacturers to initiate the action by rolling the dice for market exclusivity.
However, because the FDA currently has to evaluate the completed studies
under the current system, evaluating additional studies of a drug seeking initial
approval should not add substantially to the approval time. Furthermore, this
system would not preclude leaving in place the current system of requesting
studies and guaranteeing exclusivity, regardless of the outcome of the clinical
studies, if the FDA decided to do so.
IV. Expanding 505A Beyond Pediatric Studies
The history of drug law reforms indicates that reforms originally enacted
in response to deciencies in the pharmaceutical treatment and protection of
children have
improved pharmaceutical standards of safety in general.93 The case for at-
tempting to
Q
improve pediatric care through nancial incentives is strong. ~ However,
further drug
935ee infra Introduction.
945ee infra Part I.
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24studies for adult indications would also provide valuable information in improv-
ing overall pharmaceutical care. Pending the success of 505A, additional market
exclusivity should be extended beyond the limited sphere of pediatric studies to
encompass adult studies as well.
a. The Problem of Unapproved Drug Use in Treating the General Population
The FDA implements the world's most comprehensive new drug approval process.95
Partly for this reason, however, o-label use of drugs is a substantial problem.
O-label uses include the use of a drug to treat an entirely dierent condition
from what has been approved by the FDA, the varying of dosage of a prescrip-
tion drug from the levels indicated on the drug's labeling, use of a dierent
method of applying the treatment (e.g., injection into muscles instead of veins),
or use of the drug for a dierent patient population from that for which the
drug received approval.96 While every prescription drug is sometimes, perhaps
frequently, administered [o-label], o-label uses may represent sound medical
care or represent recklessness.97
As is the case with pediatric treatment, practitioners treat some conditions
overwhelmingly through o-label uses. In cancer treatment, o-label use is a
prevalent
955ee Wells, supra note 4, at 399 (noting that the 1938 and 1962 reforms
have resulted in the world's most involved process for new drug approval).
965ee Edmund Polubinski III, Note, Closing the Channels of COmmuni-
cation.' A First Amendment Analysis of the FDA 's Policy on Manufacturer
Promotion of O-Label Use, VA. L. REv. 991, 997 (1990).
97HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 2, at 617. In some cases, a physician who
fails to
prescribe a drug o-label might be liable for malpractice. See Polubinski, supra
note 96,
at 998.
25
25phenomenon.98 According to a study of drug-prescription pattern among cancer
specialists, approximately one third of all prescriptions were o-label.99 Fur-
thermore, of the approved anticancer drugs prescribed by oncologists during
the study, ninety six percent were prescribed at least once to treat an o-label
indication. '~ Overall, fty six percent of cancer patients were the recipients
of o-label prescriptions.101 Evidence indicates that o-label use is even more
prevalent in AIDS treatment.102
Just as the phenomenon of extensive o-label use in general is similar to
that in pediatric treatment, i 03 the problems created by o-label use are also
similar. Even though o-label use may represent the best treatment available,
concerns over liability or managed care oversight may prevent physicians from
prescribing drugs for unapproved uses.104 Of course, the best way to determine
the safety and eectiveness of a drug is to go through the FDA approval process.
While adults provide an adequate market, if a drug is already being prescribed
widely o-label, manufacturers have little reason to
98 Jagger Testimony, supra note 11.
~ See id.
~ id (compilation mine).
~ See id
102 id
103 The degree of o-label use in pediatric treatment seems to be greater than
overall oabel use, as health authorities often single out pediatric treatment for
special attention. See, e.g., Cohen Testimony, supra note 14; Jagger Testimony,
supra note 11.
104 HIOGS, supra note 14, at 17.
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26spend money for approval. In addition, if a drug's patent has expired or is near
expiration, a manufacturer will have little incentive to nance more clinical
studies.'05
b. Additional Market Exclusivity as an Inducement to Additional Testing
Whether or not 505A succeeds in persuading manufacturers to test for pe-
diatric indications, the program would likely succeed if applied to testing for
o-label uses in the general population. Additional market exclusivity would
help the pharmaceutical industry recoup a greater amount of it investments and
increase the number of drugs that break even. Currently, it is estimated that
only three out of every ten approved drugs ever recover their research and devel-
opment expenditures. i06 This low yield for manufacturers is likely to continue,
as research and development costs have continued to increase more rapidly than
prices.107 The average cost of developing a new drug has been estimated between
$359 million'08 and $500 million.'09 Despite the FDA's eorts at speeding up
the approval process, in 1995 the average approval time for a drug was over
nineteen
~ See id
'~ PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF AMER-
ICA, INDUSTRY PROFILE, supra note 39, at 13.
107 See PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, FACTS
AT A GLANCE 27.15
(1993 ed.) [hereinafter FACTS AT A GLANCE].
'08 See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF AMER-
ICA, supra note 39, at
13.
'09 See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 39, at 19.
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27months.0 The average development time for new molecular entities (NMEs)
between 1986 and 1992 was 9.2 years.11'
Sales of individual drugs help to reveal valuable incentive of delaying compe-
tition through extended exclusivity. While many manufacturers do not release
sales information for each of their products, information about many top-selling
drugs is available.2 In 1996, the top ten selling prescription drugs made between
$768 million and $1.8 billion.' '~ During the rst quarter of 1997 alone, two
cholesterol-lowering
drugs, Zocor and Mevacor, reported sales of $805 million and $275
million, 114
respectively. Crixivan, a protease inhibitor, registered $123 million in rst
quarter
sales.5 Even from these admittedly spotty gures, it is clear that six months
of additional market exclusivity could produce substantial gains and provide a
signicant inducement to conduct further testing.
The true value of additional market exclusivity is reected in the growing
inuence of competitor drugs, especially generic versions. Indeed, the reduced
time
110 See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF
AMERICA, supra note 39, at
15 (citing the U.S. Food & Drug Administration). In 1995, mean approval
time for a drug was 19.2 months. However, between 1985 and 1983, drug ap-
proval times ranged from 26.5 to 34.1 months. Seeid
See FACTS AT A GLANCE, supra note 107, at 27.21.
112 While top-selling drug data is made public, various business databases
yielded little comprehensive industry data.
~ STANDARD & PooR's, supra note 39, at 12 (citing IMS America).
~ Matthew Lerner, Pharma Earnings Surge on Healthy Drug Sales,
CHEMICAL MARKET REp., May 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8496865.
5 See id
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28during which the rst drug in a therapeutic class is the sole drug in that class
reveals the intensifying competition.6 The protable lifetime of a drug is shrink-
ing concomitantly.7 On average, a drug company has less than twelve years to
recoup research and development investment in a product.8
Increased generic drug competition, due in part to pressure by managed care
organizations, has cut into the market of originator drugs.9 For drugs whose
patents expired in 1991-1992, generic competition claimed seventy two percent
of the market within eighteen months.'20 Generic prescriptions are on the rise,'2'
and generic competition begins immediately after a patent lapses, with discounts
of up to ninety percent of the originator drug's price.'22 This creates pressure for
manufacturers to maintain a full pipeline of new products in order to maintain
protability.'23 For instance, on the day that the patent on Capoten expired,
the FDA approved thirteen new
116 See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF
AMERICA, supra note 39, at
33 - 36 (charting the period of time before introduction of a competitor
drug).
~ See id This is due in large part to the Waxman-Hatch Act of 1984,98 Stat.
1585, which reduced to zero the period between patent expiration and the entry
of generic competitors into the market.
118 PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF AMER-
ICA, supra note 39, at
36.
9 See id
120 id Compare that with drugs rst facing generic competition in 1989-
1990:
generics gained 47% of the market after eighteen months. See id
121 See STANDARD & PooR's, supra note 39, at 10. Generics grew to 22%
of the
prescription market from 19% in 1996. See Greg Muirhead, Ups and Downs,
DRUG TOPICS, May 5, 1997.
122 STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 39, at 11.
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29generic competitors, most of which were reduced by ninety percent of the name
brand
124
price.
According to estimates, once generic drugs hit the market, branded prescrip-
tion
drugs have about ten years of protability left.'25 Because [gleneric drugs..
. are unencumbered by the need to recover the high costs of researching and
developing a drug,
moving it through the lengthy FDA approval process, and advertising it,
they can reduce
126
their prices. Hence, staving o generic competition, even for six additional
months, would be of signicant value to pharmaceutical manufacturers, and
would be a potent
incentive for manufacturers to provide important information regarding treat-
ments.
Conclusion
The market exclusivity provisions in 505A, and any expansions or revisions as
proposed in Parts III and IV, involve a tradeo. Additional information about
existing drugs is being weighed against the cost of delaying cheaper, innovative
competitor products from entering the market. The FDA will report to Congress
in a few short years as to whether this tradeo has been worthwhile. This paper
has attempted to argue that 505A has the potential to be a valuable, market-
based innovation in pediatric treatment. However, the FDA should be given
expanded authority to determine both the specicity of tests requested and the
amount of exclusivity that should be awarded.
'24 See Lodewijk DeVink, The Values of Trust.' The Challenges A head for
Innovation,
VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Sept. 1, 1996.
'25 See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 39, at 15.
1261d
30
30More signicantly, 505A should be seen as an overly modest achievement. The
provision is a commendable attempt to improve information about pediatric
treatment. However, these are merely baby steps. Given a chance to reect
on the history of drug regulation, Congress should give the FDA authority to
provide the same incentives across the industry, so as to gain crucial supple-
mental treatment information about cancer, AIDS, and other conditions that
will continue to challenge us as patients, scientists, and policymakers.
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